ABSTRACT This article charts the Irish Labour Party's (ILP) journey from a minor to mainstream political party between 1987 and 1992. This is arguably the most turbulent period in the party's electoral history, when the ILP performed significantly below its average result, before making unprecedented electoral gains. It identifies the factors which led to this fall and rise during the discussed period and reflects on the ILP's place in the Irish party system arguing that the term 'mainstream' or 'proximal mainstream' party with regard to the ILP is perhaps more appropriate than the terms 'major' or 'minor' party, especially in view of its return to its usual level of support following the gains of 1992.
Introduction
In 1982 Michael Gallagher argued that the Irish Labour Party (ILP) enjoyed a solid electoral base, 'distinctive policies', 'loyal supporters', trade union backing, and a long track record of survival in unfavourable circumstances. He contended that 'for these reasons it will not disappear, but there are no signs either that it will grow dramatically, or throw off its third party status' (Gallagher, 1982: 264) . This view was shared by John Horgan (1986) , a former ILP TD and senator, who argued that his party goes through 'cycle[s] of decline and recovery, always on a small electoral base'. Horgan (1986: 164) stressed the difficulty of predicting 'whether it is within the power of the party to make a quantum leap, which will introduce a new kind of politics to Ireland'. This article will focus on the 1987-1992 period, one of the most turbulent in the ILP's history and will examine the reasons why the party achieved its lowest percentage share of the vote in over 50 years in 1987, and the processes by which it recovered in 1992 to achieve its highest vote since 1922 . Between 1987 and 1992 , the ILP managed to almost triple its total number of voters. This led to a more than threefold increase of its percentage of the vote and came close to expanding its Dáil team by 175 per cent (12 TDs in 1987 (12 TDs in compared to 33 in 1992 .
This work focuses on specific evolutionary and transformative processes leading to the ILP's return to the political mainstream in 1992. These particular areas are internal divisions within the party, party leadership, organisational structure, and rivalry with the non-Labour left. The work also attempts to locate the ILP within the wider context of theories of minor parties, and the Irish party system in particular. The case of the ILP is complicated by the fact that it has been both a major and minor party: in our view, neither definition helps to adequately explain its peculiarities. These classifications are particularly [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] , as well as electoral data. The information from these sources is triangulated with secondary sources already in the public domain and extant secondary literature which addresses different aspects or periods of ILP history. Unlike this paper, the extant literature usually focuses on periods prior to 1987 and rarely continues into the early 1990s. It includes work by Gallagher (1982) , Puirséil (2007) , and Horgan (1986) .
Labour was comparatively assessed by Gallagher (1985) , Bew et al. (1989) and Collins (1993) . Certain party 'insiders' published political memoirs, such as Finlay (1998 ), Kavanagh (2001 , Desmond (2000) and Quinn (2005) , referring to this period.
The ILP: A Major or Minor Party?
To begin, it is worth considering what is meant by the terms 'major', 'mainstream' and 'minor' parties. It has been noted that the terms 'minor' or 'small' in relation to a political party are 'problematic and indeed, relative' (Copus et al., 2009: 6; Weeks, 2010) . Minor parties offer alternative opportunities for citizen engagement where the main parties have failed to adequately represent the divergence of views and interests in modern political life (Copus et al., 2009 ). Herzog (1987: 317) argues that minor parties make elections relevant for certain groups not represented by major parties and play an 'active and significant role' in the political system. Sartori's (1976: 119) study of party systems emphasises these difficulties of definition, arguing that making a judgement on how many 'major parties' there are within a given political system often obscures more than it illuminates. Mair (1991: 43-44) suggests that a major party is one that normally polls at least 15 per cent of the national vote. By this criterion, the ILP has only been a major party in four electoral competitions (see Table 1 ). If the criterion of a minor party is that it has less than one-quarter of the midpoint number of seats of the two largest parties (O'Malley, 2010) , then the ILP has also fallen into the minor category in 1981 to 1982 and from 1982 to 1987 -despite being a coalition partner in government on both occasions. Returning to Sartori, perhaps 'relevance' is helpful in defining major or minor party status. 'Relevance' is not judged by electoral strength alone, but also the potential of any party to affect the balance of power, or 'coalition potential'. An 'irrelevant' minor party would thus be one which was never needed or put to use for any feasible coalition majority (Sartori, 1976: 122) . If this is the case, then the ILP has certainly been a 'relevant' party, whether major or minor. The ILP has also achieved Pedersen's (1982) four 'thresholds' in relation to party relevance (see also Coakley, 2010 for discussion on the ILP's place in the party system). One of the most salient descriptions of the ILP has been the 'half' in a 'two and a half party system' (Hazelkorn, 1989: 137) . Smith (1991: 36) has defined such parties in these systems as 'hinge parties'. In theory, these parties operate near the centre of the left-right axis and are free to pursue a strategy of switching support between both left and right parties. This is problematic in the ILP's case, since there is scarcely a definable left-right cleavage in Irish politics. The political cleavage in Ireland tends to be the legacy of the civil war (Weeks, to a certain degree, in post-Franco Spain. Again, following Smith (1991: 36) , the ILP cannot be described as a detached party. Detachment refers to a party's displacement from the leftright axis, for a number of reasons, often a limited electoral appeal to particular societal groups. The ILP does not fit this model since its electoral appeal is not limited to any special interest group, as are farmers' parties in Ireland (see Varley, 2010) or pensioners' parties in post-communist European states (Hanley, 2007) .
Both 'major' Irish parties have, at some stage, led single party governments in Ireland (Mair, 1987: 37 Table 1 ). The 1922 general election has been excluded because it did not contest 8 out of 28 (29 per cent) constituencies. This allowed the party to poll artificially highly on a low turnout. Using Mair's 15 per cent threshold, it can be seen that the ILP has achieved major party status on only four occasions, 1943, 1965, 1969 and 1992 1948-1951, 1954-1957, 1973-1977, 1981-1982, 1982-1987 and 1992-1997 (twice) , it has certainly had Sartori's coalition potential, and as such was a relevant, if not necessarily numerically major party.
Neither, as we have seen, did it follow Smith's (1991) definition of a 'hinge party', since it only 'swung' towards non-Fianna Fáil alternatives, with the sole exception being 1992. It might thus be classed as a relevant party, with coalition potential, and the potential to be a party of government. This suggests that the party perhaps belongs in a separate category, neither major nor minor, but 'mainstream'. A 'mainstream' party is one that is often close to major party status, is a potential party of government, and not ideologically constrained from taking part in a coalition such as far-right or far-left parties often are. This is true of parties such as the French and Italian Communist parties, which have won between a third and a quarter of electoral support but whose coalition potential was virtually zero due to their ideological heritage (Sartori, 1976: 122-123 Labour's TDs (Kavanagh, 2001: 37, 41 Here, we can perhaps see the ILP taking on aspects of the 'electoral-professional' party as classified by Panebianco (1988: 263) . Such parties are characterised by their focus on elections rather than ideological dogma. These pragmatic characteristics were evident with the Militant expulsions, and sidelining of the Labour Left. It is acknowledged, however, that the leadership's defeat of the leftist factions was not purely a result of a desire to increase its electoral support: the ILP leadership was in any case firmly opposed to the policies of both these groups. However, the issue based approach and the ILP's perception as a progressive party helped turn around its electoral decline. This, however, would not have happened had it not been for a reversal in Dick Spring's fortunes as the ILP leader.
Leadership of the Party
In 1987 (Labour, 1986: 32) .
Electoral Strategy and Organisation
On the eve of the 1987 election, it was argued that the ILP resembled a '"rainbow" coalition of minority groups and interests which may be impossible to reconcile ' (Labour, 1986: 24) .
Far-reaching organisational changes, like taking decision making powers away from the annual conference and the disbandment of the Administrative Council (AC), were necessary.
Spring described his party's organisation in the 1980s as 'appalling' and 'the world's worst' (Collins, 1993: 99) . It was, according to some, a 'party of warring factions and political unreliability' (Horgan, 1986: 31) or a 'party suffering from a] malaise that looked insuperable' (Kavanagh, 2001: 2) . These comments merely reflected the fact that the ILP was a political entity lacking a centralised, fully fledged administration (Gallagher, 1982: 253-254; Puirséil, 2007: 309) , and a party which electorally functioned like 'a federation of 15, 16 (Finlay, 1998: 61) . This was achieved through the increased centralisation of party structures and operational activities to strengthen and renew the party image. The ILP enjoyed a steady rise in the opinion polls from 1988 onwards (Kavanagh, 1991) , and successfully utilised the newfound popularity of its leader as an asset to convince the electorate that it was a coherent political unit, and had never been a 'one man band' (PLP Minutes, 7 February 1990). many candidates (Farrell, 1993: 26) and decided it 'wouldn't disrupt the organisation by trying to parachute another layer of candidates on the eve of elections' (interview with Brendan Howlin, 23 October 2008).
During this period, the ILP displayed elements of Duverger's cadre party, which relies on the grouping of notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting campaigns, and maintaining contact with candidates (Duverger, 1954: 64) . While the input from the Dublinbased ILP leadership in renewing the party's organisation and standardising its electoral campaign platform might perhaps be seen as evidence of this, overall the ILP fails to fit the cadre party model, because of its attempts to gain large membership along mass party lines and reliance on rank-and-file membership in decision-making processes.
Rivalry on the Irish Left
A primary indication of the ILP's descent into minor party status in 1987 was the level of threat other political entities posed to the ILP, when non-Labour left parties and candidates almost equalled the ILP's share of the vote (Coakley & Gallagher, 2005; Electionsireland.org, 1998 Electionsireland.org, -2008 . However, by 1992 this threat was minimised by mergers with two leftist micro-parties and a split in the ranks of Labour's main rival on the Left -the Workers' Party. coalition was plagued by numerous corruption scandals (Collins, 2000: 219-220) . The latter overtook the ILP as the third largest party in 1987 (Collins, 2005) . The change of Taoiseach, nine months before the general election, also did little to improve the governing coalition's fortunes, and Albert Reynolds, 'an old-fashioned country and western singing person' proved to be unpopular with the electorate (interview with Ray Kavanagh, 23 October 2008) . At the same time, the ILP, through its association with Spring and Robinson, was seen as untainted by corruption, and this is reflected in the success of 1992.
In contrast to Fine Gael support for Haughey's government, 'you had the white knight, Dick
Spring, riding to charge every time in parliament, and he did it forensically, great speeches, Interestingly, the ILP chose to forsake this option on the eve of the 1997 election and effectively became 'the swing party [that] decided not to swing' (Mitchell, 1999: 248) . It chose to campaign as a coalition member and through Dick Spring announced its unwillingness to coalesce with Fianna Fáil (Murphy, 1998: 127) . This reduced its political options to reliance on Fine Gael and disabled its potential ambition to take over the electorate and some of the personnel of DL. As a result, the ILP, campaigning as a member of a successful but only relatively popular governing coalition, lost almost all of its 1992 gains and returned to its circa 11 per cent share of the vote and only 17 TDs -a loss of over 50 per cent in its number of votes and parliamentarians.
This result was far worse than expected by the ILP, which hoped to defend more than 20 of its seats with up to 13 per cent of the popular vote (Holmes, 1999: 33) . In Ray Kavanagh's view the absence of 'extraordinary political circumstances' which existed in 1992 precipitated his party's return to the 'half' in a 'two and a half party system' (interview, 23
October 2008 
Conclusion
Throughout its history, the ILP has been a constant feature of Irish politics. As we have shown, it has achieved an average 11 per cent share of, and carved a distinctive niche in, the party system. Because of its longevity and consistency, categorising the ILP as a minor party if at all, is fraught with difficulty given that the party has tended to fare badly no matter which other party it coalesced with. It remains to be seen whether, under the popular leadership of Éamon Gilmore, the party can successfully achieve and sustain major party status, and remain above Mair's 15 per cent threshold for a prolonged period.
